Trump Doesn't Want the Same Old Options from the Pentagon on Afghanistan

Daniel R. DePetris

Security, Middle East

If salvaging the war in Afghanistan was easy, the policy debate would be have been over by now.

What does a country do when its military has been fighting a conflict half-way around the world for over a decade and a half, supporting a host government so corrupted internally, disorganized politically, and at a very real risk of collapsing completely without continuous international military and financial support? The United States is in exactly that predicament with respect to its never ending mission in Afghanistan, a nation whose political leadership never misses an opportunity to quarrel with each other and make a mistake.

One can say a lot of things about how Donald Trump has conducted himself as president of the United States. His management of the Oval Office is less to be desired. His propensity to use escalatory rhetoric, like his infamous “fire and fury” comment directed at North Korea, oftentimes make a fragile situation worse.

But what you can't do is blame Trump for demanding additional options from his national security team for what to do in Afghanistan—even if one of those options involves outsourcing the war effort to former Blackwater CEO Erik Prince and his private army of ex special forces soldiers.

If salvaging the war in Afghanistan was easy, the policy debate would be have been over by now. U.S. Commander John Nicholson and National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster would get their 4,000–5,000 additional troops, a more expansive list of targets, looser rules of engagement, and an unconditional amount of time to turn the country's security situation around. The United States, in effect, would be relying on the status-quo war strategy that Washington has followed for years; the only difference would be the amount of resources field commanders are able to tap into.

But, of course, Afghanistan isn't easy. If it were easy, Afghanistan would be the crown jewel of Central Asia. Instead, the Taliban insurgency is the strongest it has ever been since the war began controlling or contesting nearly 40 percent of the country, whose pockets are flush with money made from taxing poppy farmers, and with a house across the border in western Pakistan that U.S. forces—and the Pakistanis themselves—can't or won't touch. To his credit, Trump doesn't want the same old options from the Pentagon, which is why he refused to sign on to McMaster's request for more troops earlier in the spring.

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