This is why desperation – not strategy – is driving the US-Israel strikes on Iran

Military action replaces diplomacy, forcing Iran into asymmetric responses and pushing the Middle East to a tipping point

On the morning of February 28, Israel and the US launched a military operation against Iran, an action Tehran views as unprovoked aggression – especially striking given that talks were still ongoing. The situation was made even more tense by the fact that just hours before the strikes, US President Donald Trump publicly stated that no final decision on Iran had been made. While expressing frustration with the pace of negotiations, he emphasized that further discussions were expected next week.

From the Iranian side, there remained a cautious hope for progress – even if only by a fraction of a percent – but enough to potentially reach a compromise. Observers noted that the negotiations were at a delicate stage: parties had converged on several technical points, and diplomatic channels were still active.

Meanwhile, the US press had already seen some suggestive leaks the day before. Two senior military officials told the New York Times that despite an increased military presence near Iran, the Pentagon lacked sufficient forces and munitions for a sustained air campaign. One official estimated that US forces in the region could strike for only about seven to ten days before resources were significantly depleted. Essentially, these assessments cast doubt on the sustainability of an operation, highlighting its likely limited scope and timeframe.

Notably, NBC News, citing a senior diplomat, reported that Israel had taken steps specifically aimed at undermining the near-complete progress of US-Iran talks last week. “Yet again, when negotiations get close to success, Israel has intervened,” the source told the network. “Yet again, an Israeli tail is wagging the American dog,” suggesting that Israeli actions significantly shaped US foreign policy at a moment when key breakthroughs were within reach.

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Following the strikes, Iran responded almost immediately. Tehran targeted American bases in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, provoking sharp criticism from all of those countries. Some reports indicated that Saudi Arabia was joining the military action against Iran, formally staking its position. It’s important to remember that Iran had repeatedly warned its Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that any US or Israeli strikes on Iranian territory would make American military facilities in the region legitimate targets. This primarily referred to US bases across the Gulf. Under Iranian military doctrine, these responses are framed as self-defense: infrastructure used to attack Iran automatically becomes a permissible target.

Domestically, the so-called “hawkish” faction in Iran has been gaining ground. A military-focused approach – especially after strikes on symbolic and strategic sites in Tehran, including the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry of Defense, the Supreme Leader’s office, nuclear program facilities, and the presidential residence – effectively sidelines diplomatic rhetoric. With US and Israeli officials openly declaring the legitimacy of eliminating Iran’s top political leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, Tehran sees this not as nuclear pressure, but as an attempt to dismantle the regime entirely.

From the beginning, the nuclear issue served as a pretext; the real goal for opponents has been dismantling Iran’s political system. Tehran interprets it as an attempt to strip the country of sovereignty and the ability to act independently on the world stage. Iran’s insistence on remaining outside the American-led regional security architecture remains a persistent irritant for various White House administrations.

The domestic political dimension in the US also matters. The move toward a military option reflects the growing influence of hardliners, represented by senators such as Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz, who advocate for coercive action against Iran. The strategy now bets on maximum pressure, potentially pushing for radical regime change. Many observers argue that Trump opted for a confrontational approach, hoping for a quick and dramatic impact.

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But the regional context is fundamentally different. Iran is a major regional power with a sophisticated influence network, a wide web of proxies, and a complex geography. Its position at the crossroads of the Middle East and Western Asia means that any large-scale escalation inevitably affects nearly all neighboring countries and disrupts critical transport and energy routes. Already, Iran has been provoked into asymmetric responses, expanding the conflict beyond the initial theater.

Strikingly, the US and Israeli attacks on Iran appear, in many ways, as acts of desperation after exhausting alternative pressure tools. Over recent months, Washington and its allies applied a full spectrum of measures: sanctions, diplomatic isolation, attempts at internal destabilization, and information-psychological operations. In early January, the focus was on internal destabilization, echoing a “color revolution” model. But Iranian authorities responded decisively, limiting communications, controlling public activity, and consolidating power – successfully maintaining governance despite economic losses.

Attempts to revive an alternative center of legitimacy, such as the so-called “crown prince” in exile, failed politically. Marginalized domestically and lacking significant diaspora support, the figure could not mobilize meaningful opposition.

With soft power, sanctions, and managed destabilization failing, a sharp escalation became the remaining option. In this context, the strikes on Iran can be seen as a high-stakes gamble – an effort to raise the stakes and force the confrontation into a military dimension.

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Domestic politics in the US intensify this pressure. By promising to “solve the Iran problem,” the Trump administration set expectations high. With political stakes elevated, backing down would be perceived as weakness – especially for Trump personally.

For a long time, it was unclear whether Israel or the US would act first. Ultimately, a synchronized approach was chosen, with Israel initiating action backed by American involvement. This reduces the risks of unilateral blame and signals a united front.

Yet strategic risks remain high. If previous pressure tools failed to fracture Iran internally, a limited military strike is unlikely to yield a different outcome. On the contrary, it may strengthen domestic consolidation and prolong the conflict in unpredictable ways. With midterm Senate and House elections approaching, Trump isn’t just taking a risk: if he fails to achieve “regime change” – not just eliminating top leaders, but dismantling the Islamic system itself, an almost impossible feat – his standing could end up far worse than he imagines. History may judge him more harshly than predecessors like Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, or Joe Biden, whom he despises and resents being compared to.

February 28 may mark a point of no return. If the US and Israel succeed in eliminating Iran’s entire military-political establishment – a longtime ambition – there will be no safe corner in the Middle East. No one will be able to sit this out. It’s no wonder that the phrase “Iran is not Iraq” has been repeated for years. Bush failed in Iraq; based on current trends, Trump may be headed for a similar outcome.