How Russia Gave Birth to THAAD

Kyle Mizokami

Security, Eurasia

The history of the missile China loves to hate.

The antiballistic missile that promises to defend South Korea from North Korean nukes has its origins in a Cold War requirement to defend U.S. forces from Soviet tactical missiles. Despite a rocky development history, the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD) missile defense system now appears to be Seoul’s best defense against a similar attack from the north.

In the late 1980s, the U.S. Army had a requirement for a system to shield ground troops from the threat of ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union integrated ballistic missiles into its force structure down to the division level, with a battalion of SS-21 “Scarab” short-range missile launchers integrated into every motor rifle and tank division stationed in eastern Europe. The SS-21 had a range of seventy-five miles. Further up the chain, the Soviets fielded the SS-23 “Spider,” the replacement for the venerable Scud missile, with a range of 310 miles. Finally, the SS-20 “Saber” intermediate-range missile could be expected to strike tactical targets throughout Europe at ranges of up to 3,200 miles.

The Army’s new medium-range air-defense missile, the Patriot, was not designed to shoot down incoming missile warheads, a very different task from the Patriot’s mission of downing low-altitude strike aircraft. The decision was made to develop a separate system, and in 1987 the system that would become THAAD was born.

The end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the USSR and Warsaw Pact, at first glance appeared to end the ballistic-missile threat. However, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait exposed a gaping hole in the coalition opposing Iraq’s defenses: Iraqi president Saddam Hussein had hundreds of locally made Al Hussein missiles modeled after the Scud. Patriot PAC-2 missiles pressed into service to defend Israel and Saudi Arabia were originally credited with a high intercept ratio in excess of 90 percent, but subsequent studies revealed few, if any, of the Patriots downed their targets. A tendency for the Al Hussein to break up in reentry, and the Patriot’s delayed proximity fuse, optimized for aircraft, meant many Iraqi warheads made it through the improvised defenses.

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