Moldovan President Maia Sandu has caused a furor. 

In an interview with Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart, two British political figures turned podcasters, she openly stated she would vote for unification with Romania if there were a referendum.  

Unionists on both sides of the River Prut were elated. For more than three decades, they have been pushing for the removal of the border which had separated the two sister countries since 1940, when Romanian-speaking Moldova was annexed by the Soviet Union.  

Pro-Russian factions in Chișinău lashed out, decrying Sandu’s “betrayal of national interests,” and calling for her resignation.  

With passion running high on both sides, it was no surprise the Moldovan government rushed to reassure the public, insisting the latest statement merely reflected Sandu’s personal choice and not her official position.  

But those who have been paying attention, particularly to the energy sector, will have noticed some intriguing developments in recent years.  

Moldova’s electricity and gas policies have been aligning closer with Romania’s, and the step is arguably one of the most critical towards the unification of the two countries.  

There’s no conspiracy here; it’s simply that the alignment has been driven by necessity.  

Much of the impetus has come from Kremlin meddling. Since 2021, Russia has sought to trigger repeated energy crises, expecting to blackmail Moldova’s pro-EU government and derail the country’s aspirations to join the bloc.  

Until then, Moldova had depended for all its gas consumption and three-quarters of its electricity demand on Russian-controlled resources.  

It’s hardly an exaggeration to say the country’s single biggest vulnerability to Moscow’s blackmail was its extreme reliance on Russian energy resources.  

But Russia’s plans to destabilize the small country of 2.5million people have backfired.  

By limiting gas supplies to Moldova in winters 2021 and 2022 and then cutting deliveries altogether to Transnistria in winter 2025, the Kremlin lost its grip over the whole country.  

Moldova acted fast to diversify away, while Transnistria, a breakaway Russian-speaking province internationally recognized as being part of Moldova, could soon see major structural changes since the Kremlin is no longer able to use free gas supplies to fuel separatism.  

Chișinău’s gas diversification plan was the first step towards severing its links to Russia. 

Moldova can now buy gas in any neighboring European country, but to bring them home it uses an interconnector with Romania, which entered operation only a few weeks before the first energy crisis of winter 2021.  

Since then, Moldova has taken other critical steps to align with Romania.  

It passed rules allowing it to shift the operation of its strategic gas transmission infrastructure from a company majority owned by Russia’s Gazprom to the operator of the Romanian-Moldovan gas interconnector. The latter is a daughter company of the Romanian gas grid operator, Transgaz. 

Technical experts say the two gas markets should now merge to streamline operations and cut costs.  

Moldovan companies have secured licenses to trade in Romania, just as Romanian energy exchanges, suppliers, and producers have been opening subsidiaries in Chișinău.  

Romania’s commitment to Moldova is even embedded in its national energy strategy up to 2035.  

The document specifically mentions that the integration of its electricity and gas infrastructure with that of Moldova is of “strategic importance.” 

It also notes that Romania’s energy security is unequivocally tied to that of Moldova’s and that it “should be in a position to guarantee all of Moldova’s energy needs for an indefinite period of time and under any circumstances.” 

The strategy is taking shape. 

Within a few weeks, Moldova will also boost its electricity supply security as a much-delayed direct, high-voltage line linking it to southeastern Romania is expected to come into operation.  

Moldova had been using lines built in the Soviet era that passed through Transnistria to import electricity from Romania, presenting a major security risk.  

Two additional electricity interconnectors with eastern Romania scheduled for operation later this decade will also boost Moldova’s security of supply, as the country will be able to import more electricity from Romania.   

Even Transnistria, which depended on free Russian gas deliveries to sustain its separatist structures, has been relying on Russian-funded exports delivered via Romania.  

Although Moscow uses Hungary and Dubai-based companies to buy and deliver the gas to Transnistria, the arrangement is difficult to sustain amid international sanctions against Russia.  

If circumstances persist, Transnistrian authorities will have to consider structural reform, which would inevitably align it with Moldova and implicitly Romania. 

Unification may not enjoy widespread popular support on either side of the River Prut, at least for now (polls suggest a majority oppose such a move, with around 30% in favor).  

However, the rapid convergence of the two countries’ energy sectors shows that alignment is already underway, primarily driven by security concerns. 

For Bucharest, regional stability is linked to Moldova’s energy security. The events of the last five years showed Russia was ready to use the energy lever to destabilize the country and the wider neighborhood.  

For Chisinau, Romania is a guarantor of resilience, which it requires on its path to EU integration.  

The countries may tactfully avoid the subject of unification, and it will be argued that this isn’t on the cards for now. But the truth remains that work is underway to ensure that in a sudden crisis, the barriers to union could be overcome. 

Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist writing for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. She is also a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).  

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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